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Case No. 9141 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAI-I 
BEATRICE J. BOYLE, now Beatrice 
.J. Boyle Wynes, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v~. 
GLEN A. BAGGS and FREDDIE BAGGS, 
his wife, 
Respondents and Claimants. 
STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court 
granting the 1fotion of the Respondents, Glen A. Baggs 
and Freddie Baggs, to dismiss the appellant's complaint 
"because the same does not state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted." The entire file, Beatrice .J. Boyle 
vs. George A. Boyle, Jr., District Court in and for 
Weber County, Utah, file No. 22 901 has be·en desig-
nated a~ the record on appeal. 
Th'e -plaintiff and appellant, Beatrice J. Boyle 
Wynes, filed her action seeking a divorce from George 
A. Boyle, Jr., and the following statement of facts 
chronologically ~et out should aid in an understanding 
of the history of the Boyle vs. Boyle case as it affects 
the appellant and respondent. References are to page 
number in Boyle vs. Boyle. 
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1948 - Decree of Divorce entered providing for 
the monthly installments of support 1noney 
for a minor child at $40.00 per 1nonth to 
begin with ~larch, 1948. Page 6. 
1949 - Decree modified lowering the support 
pay1nents to $25.00 per 1nonth. -:\[ inute 
Entry Page 10, Order Page 17. 
1950 - Plaintiff filed Affidavit, Page 11, alleging 
a delinquency and Order entered directing 
that the defendant Boyle pay $30.00 per 
month, $5.00 per month to apply on the 
delinquency, Page 17. (See allegation No. 
4, of plaintiffs Petition.) 
1952 - Child adopted in August of this year by 
plaintiff's new husband and obligation on 
Boyle to pay support n1oney C'eased. Page 
23. 
1952 - Support su1ns accrued and owing and un-
paid total the sum of $987.00 (S_ee sworn 
testimony of plaintiff in deposition before 
Oom1nission showing delinquency accruing 
$197.50 for 1948; $450.00 for 1949; $270.50 
for 1950; $300.00 for 1951 ; and $175.00 for 
1952.) Page 31 (See also paragraph~ 9 
and 10 of plaintiff's Petition) 
1954 - August 4, property acquired by defendant 
Boyle. ( Se paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's 
Petition.) 
1955 - Septe1nber 19, 1955, George A. Boyle, Jr., 
h~· deed conveyed his interest in the real 
property to the respondents, Glen A. 
Baggs and Freddie Baggs. See allegations 
of paragraph 6 of plai-ntiff's Petition. 
1955 - December 29, Petition alleging delin-
quency filed by plaintiff praying for judg-
Inent in the smn of $987.00. Pages ~~-~:~-
24. (See paragraph 7 of plaintiff's Peti-
tion. 
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That hy subsequent transfers of the interest in said 
real propert~· there cmne into the hands of a real estate 
broker, funds whirh hy stipulation were deposited with 
Lawrence M . . Malan, Clerk of the above-named Court, 
awaiting distribution according to the validity of the 
claim~ 1nade hy the plaintiff and appellant and clailn-
ants and I'Pf-ipondenh; to said funds. 
The defendant, George Boyle, Jr., has no claim to 
~aid funds and is not a party to or concerned with this 
appeal and Henry C. Wolfe and Yvonne Wolfe, listed 
as claimants, have on stipulation been dismissed as 
claimantf-i in this proceeding. 
'J.1he plaintiff and appellant claims the funds under 
the provision of the divorce decree awarding monthly 
support moneys and the lien existing for delinquent and 
unpaid support money due as of the time the defendant 
George A. Boyle, .Jr., acquired an interest in said real 
property in 1954. The funds being held came from the 
sale of the equity the said Glenn A. Baggs and Freddie 
Baggs had acquired in said real property and are claimed 
by them for this reason. 
Th'ere being no other claimants to said funds the 
order granting the claimants and respondents Motion 
to dis1niss is a final order fully determinative of the 
plaintiff's claim to said funds. 
The parties to the appeal have stipulated as follows: 
1. The record on appeal. 
2. Waiver of bond on appeal. 
3. Waiver of award of costs on appeal. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
1. Granting of Motion to Dismiss was in error. 
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2. A Decree of the District Court ordering payments 
in the future of monthly sums as alimony and support 
money automatically establishes a lien as each payment 
accrues and is unpaid. 
3. Notice to the defendant buyers was adequate 
to put them on a duty of inquiry. 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT 1. 
GRANTING OF J\10TION TO DISl\IISS WAS IN 
ERROR. 
The plaintiff and appellant's petition for an Order 
directing delivery of the funds to her is in the file con-
stituting the record on appeal and contains 13 alleging 
paragraphs and 5 paragraphs in the prayer. Boyle vs. 
Boyle, file pages 36, 37, and 38. Rule 8A sets out the 
requirements of a complaint as follows: 
"1. A short and plain state1nent of the claims 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 
"2. A demand for judgment for the reli'ef to 
which he deems hinu;elf entitled." 
Rule 8E (1) (URCP Page 488) provides that each avert-
lnent of a pleading shall he sin1ple, concise and direct. 
That no technical fonns of pleading or 1notion are re-
quired. 
This Court has been called upon to decide upon the 
sufficiency of a complaint under the rules in several 
cases. Smne of these are referred to in the case of 
Blackhan1 vs. Snelgrove, 280 Pacific ~. 453, 3 Utah 2, 
1957, which involved an: 
''Appeal from an order of dis1nissal for fail-
ure of plaintiff's cmnplaint to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted . ., 
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In this ea~P H(•wdt was charged with a felony and 
Blaekhmn dPpo:.;ited with the Clerk of the Court $1,000.00 
ea~li hail. Upon the dismis~ml of the erin1inal charge 
Hlad;lmm denmnded tlH• money which the Clerk refused 
to give hint. Blackhan1 then brought suit, the defendant 
( 
11Prk filed a Motion to Dis1niss and the Court granted 
the order of Dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to state 
a clai1n upon which relief can be grounded. 'rhe record 
doe~ not show the basis on which the trial court found 
the plaintiff's cmnplaint def1ective, hut on appeal it was 
claimed that the Order granting the ?\lotion to Dismiss 
wa~ based upon the plaintiff's failure to allege himself 
the owner of the nwney deposited as cashbail. The Court 
then con~iders the following rules: 12B ( 6) which per-
mits the dismissal of a case for failure of the pleading to 
state a clain1 upon which relief can be granted. Rule 
SA sets out what the con1plaint must contain in order 
to state the clai1n for relief: 
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief * * * shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the clailn showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief; and (:3) a demand for judg-
lnent." 
Rule SE ( 1) provides no technical form of pleadings or 
1notions are required and Rule SF states all pleadings 
shall be so ronstrued as to do substantial justice. 
The Court in its opinion in the Blackham vs. 
Snelgrove case refers to the Federal Rules and points 
up the very substantial change that has taken place 
under the new pre-trial discovery mechanis1n established 
by Rules 26 to 37, pointing out that before these rules 
were enacted the drafting of the issues and pleadings 
were very important to try and fix the issues. The new 
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rules however, restrict the pleadings to the task of 
general notice giving and invest the deposition discovery 
process with the vital role in the preparation for trial. 
. At Page 455, the Court states: 
"Thus it can ve~y often he found stated in 
these cases that a complaint is only required to 
' * * * give the opposing party fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of a claim and a 
general indiPation of- the type of litigation in-
volved.' '' 
It can also frequently he found stated in these cases 
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless 
it app'ears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be en-
titled to no relief under any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of the claim. 
The reasoning behind these federal court cases is 
well summed up in LEIMER vs. STATE :MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COl\IPANY, 8 Cir, 1940, 108 Federal 2d, 
302 at page 30G. 
''ln vif'w of the 1neans which the Rules of 
( iiviJ Procedure afford a defendant to obtain a 
speedy disposition of a clailn which was without 
foundation or substance either by securing a 1nore 
definite staten1ent or bill of particulars under 
Rule 1~ ( P) and thereafter applying for on the 
pleadings under Rule 12 (h) (1), or by nwving 
for a summary judgn1ent under Hule ;){), we think 
ther'e is no justification for dis1nissing a com-
plaint for insufficiency of statement, except 
where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would be entitled to no relief under anv state of 
facts which eould be proved in suppo.rt of the 
claim." 
The Court then directed a reversal of the Dish·iet 
Court's Order dismissing the complaint. 
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In the case of LIQUOR CONTROL COMl\IISSION 
vs. ATHAS, 243 P2, 441, the liquor commission sued 
Athas and Lack for an account of the proceeds and con-
version of the value of liquor sold by the defendants 
after the plaintiff's delivery to thein at their drug store 
under a liquor package agency. The District Court dis-
Inissed the Cmnmission's coinplaint for failure to state 
a clai1n upon which relief could be granted and also for 
failure to furnish a 1nore definite statement as ordered 
by the Court pursuant to Rule 12 E. rrhis court held 
that the cmnplaint did state a cause of action. 
Plaintiff and appellant therefore respectfully con-
tend~ that her 13 paragraph petition does constitute a 
c·ause of action entitling her to the funds now held by 
the Clerk of the District Court and that the granting of 
the l\[otion to Dismi~s \vas error. 
POINT 2. 
A DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OR-
DERING PAYl\IE-NTS IN THE FUTURE OF 
NIONTHL Y SUl\fS AS ALIMONY AND SUPPORT 
l\IONEY AUTONIATICALLY ESTABLISHES A 
LIEN AS EACH PAYl\fENT ACCRUES AND IS UN-
PAID. 
1,he original briefs are in the file designated 
Record on Appeal but since the plaintiff and ap-
pellant's is a reply brief it is appropriate to present her 
authorities and argum1ents as an appellant and this ac-
cordingly has been done. 
Our Supreme Court has considered two cases which 
bear on th'e question to be resolved, namely: 
BEESLEY vs. BADGER, 66 Utah 194; 240 Pac-
ific 458 
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OPENSHAW vs. OPENSHAW, 105 Utah 574; 
144 Pacific 2 528 
At least five situations exist under various support 
money Decrees and at the outset the distinction between 
them should be made : 
1. A decree providing for payment of future install-
ments without any installment being delinquent. 
In such a case no lien exists. 
2. A decree providing for payment of future in-
stallments where there are accrued and unpaid 
installments. 
3. A subsequent or second judgment entered after 
the original divorce decree for past du'e install-
ments. 
4. Lump sum award. 
5. A Decree specifically providing that the judg-
nlent is a lien. 
'rhe law in the Beesley ease and n1ost other authorities 
establishes a lien in all of the last three situations. See 
Beesley case at Page 460. 
No lien exists where no sums are due which covers 
the first situation. 
The second situation is the one 1n focus 1n this 
appeal. 
The Beesley ea~e (supra) at Page 460 in the left 
column in the top 1 j3 of the page discusses the various 
kinds of ~upport n1oney decrees, then ~tates: 
"When no such lien is declared or ilnpressed by 
the Court, itself, we, from the texts and the case.s 
there cited, and frmn the statute, deduce and de-
clare this to be the rule: \Vhen a divorce is 
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granted and the hu~hand ordered to pay alilnony 
or to ~npport minor children or both, and the 
DP<'I'PP itself do<>~ not declare or i1npress a lien 
to ~P<·ure such pay1nents then, by force of the 
s/atulc ,relatinq to .f~td,qnunts in geueral, suclz 
rlecrel' or j"d.fJIII<'nl from the fdinq and docketing 
thereof /)('Comes and has all the force and effect 
of a lieu to the .'·:ame extent as an ordinary judg-
111<'111 for JJIOIIf',IJ, when the dPcrcr for alimony is 
in a gro~~ ~ann, though payable partly or wholly 
in future in~tallments, and when not in gross 
smn, but, as here, in ius/aliments for an ,indefinite 
]J('riod, the derrce is a lien securinq payment of 
all d1te aHd u n JHtid installments, hut not of install-
ment:; to becorne due in the future. By weight 
of authority, and as we think the better reason, 
although th'ere are cases to the contrary, a decree 
for alimo11.1J in a gross sum as u~<'ll as to past d1tc 
a Jirl un JWid install m cnts stands upon the smne 
footin,fl as an ordinary money judgment and 1nay 
be enforc<'rl by e.r<'cut,ion in the same manner as 
onlinar_11 money judgments may be enforced. 
'" "' "" ~ A judgnr'ent or deeree awarding alilnony 
in a gross sum, though payable in future install-
menb, i:-; neverthele~s definite and certain as to 
the stun of nroney to he paid. So is a decree as 
to past-due instalhnents. In such instances the 
amount du'e and to be paid to discharge the lien 
i~ certain and definite, and, if sought to be en-
forced by execution, the anrount due and unpaid 
can be stated in the writ of execution." (italics 
ours). 
The Court in the Openshaw case (supra) refers to the 
Bee~ley case at Page :>:30, paragraph 6 and 7 at the 
middle of the right cohnnn: 
''In Bee~·dey vs. Badger, 66 Utah 194; 240 P 458, 
we stated that a decree for the payment of ali-
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mony op'erates as a judgment lien as to all past 
due and unpaid installments. Execution may 
therefore issue for the arrearage accumulated 
within a period of eight years." 
The Court further states in the first paragraph in the 
right column of Page 530 as follows: 
"That the right of the trial court to modify an 
alimony or support money award does not ex-
tend to installments which have already accrued 
and which are past due, because the right to 
collect such installment~ becomes vested upon the 
due date." 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 Section 30-4-3 provides 
that the Court may by Order and Decree "provide how 
and when payments shall be made and that the wife 
shall have a lien upon the property of the husband to 
secure payment of th'e smne." 
Section 78-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is the 
succeeding Section to Section 68 Laws of Utah, referred 
to in the Beesley case, supra. See the middle of the right 
column page 459 and recites that a judgment is a lien 
from the time it is docketed. Also Section 69-12 and 
Section 69-13, Laws of Utah, 1917, as referred to at the 
right column at the 1niddle of page 459, becanw our Rule 
69 and recites that the party in whose favor judg1nent 
is given may within any tiine within eight years have 
execution issue for the enforcem(lnt of the judgment. 
But nothing is said in any of these Section~ that 
any proceeding ne·ed be taken by the plaintiff subsequent 
to the original ;judgn1ent to have the Court decide what 
sum is now due and unpaid under the judgment. But 
requires only that the amount actually due thereon must 
be stated in the writ of exerution. 
10 
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The judg1ncnt creditor in an ordinary money judg-
ment does not have to go hack into Court and recite the 
interPst which has accrued and the payments made in 
order to ha vP his ·execution but only needs to file a 
preci p(' in which he recites tlw an1ount actually due 
under the judg1nent. When this is filed with the Clerk 
of the Court the ClPrk then makes a \Vrit of Execution 
based upon the precipe. See 21 A1nerican .Jurisprudence 
~f'(•t ion 44, Page 35, which statPs: 
"A \Vrit of Execution is usually iss1wd upon pre-
(•ipP of the judg1nent creditor." 
LikewisP instalhnents ordered to be paid under a 
divorce decree which have become due and are unpaid 
are stated in a precipe 1nade hy the plaintiff or her 
counsel, and based upon the precipe's recital of the 
amount due, unpaid and owing, the Clerk of the Court 
issues the \Vrit of Execution. The a1nount due under 
any judgment is equally uncertain because of payments 
1nade by judg1nent debtor and interest accrued and 
no 1nore error would likely occur in calculating the ac-
crued interest and the balance due under a promis-
sory note judgment than under a monthly support money 
judgment particularly where, as in this case, all pay-
m·ents 1nade hy the defendant Boyle were paid through 
the Clerk of the Court. (See question and answer to 
interrogatories before commissioner to establish basis 
for judgn1ent.) 
Attorneys often file an affidavit or petition reciting 
a delinquency and asking judg1nent thereon, but ordin-
arily use the affidavit or petition only as a basis for an 
Order to Show Cause to bring the defendant before the 
Court and through pressure of contempt try to get him 
to pay and not primarily to establish a judgment subse-
11 
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quent to the divorce decree fixing the an1ount due. 
The claimant Baggs may atten1pt to read into the 
Beesley and Openshaw eases a need for the plaintiff 
holding a divorce decree to return to Court and ·establish 
the amount due in some subsequent judgment before 
she is eligible for a \Vrit of Execution and before any 
lien attach'es; reasoning that since Mrs. Openshaw filed 
an application for a "\Vrit of Execution that thi~ proced--
ure is necessary before execution could issue on accrued 
unpaid support 1noney. The Court in the Openshaw case, 
supra, said that it was proper for the plaintiff to follow 
that procedure. (See lower half of page 530). However, 
plaintiff's counsel in that situation was doubtless 
prmnpted hy many considerations to ask for such a 
judgment. Some of the1n were that more than eight 
years had elapsed since the entry of the Decree, from 
1932 to 19-H, and items 1nay haYe been in dispute and 
as c·lain1ed by thr• defendant, the plaintiff had Inislead 
him into a situation of laches. Also it was obs·erved 
that the plaintiff in the Openshaw case filed in eon-
junction with her request for a judg1nent fixing the 
amount delinquent and due, an Order to Show Cause 
citing the defendant for conte1npt. Rule 69B, which 
is based on Sec. 104-37-~ U.C.A. 1943 referred to in the 
Openshaw case, does not require that the precipe re-
questing the "T ri t of Execution state that the a1nount due 
thereunder, has been frcshJ~T dPereed hy the Court, since 
the amount actnaJI~· due under an installment support de-
cree or an ordinm·~· money judgment Yaries frmn day to 
day as paynwnts arc made and inter0st aeerues. So that 
it would he foolish for the plaintiff to run to the Court 
periodically to fix the amount due under the judg1nent 
before execution could issue• tlwreon. 
12 
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The following cases are authorities for the position 
that the plaintiff 'vife need not return to Court and ob-
tain a new or second judgment in order to have a lien. 
KEPIIAR'r v~. JCEPHART, 193 F2, G77. This is 
a 19;"">1 (·a~e in the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of 
Cohunbia Circuit. A divorce in 1936 ordered the de-
fendant to pay $75.00 per month for the support of the 
wife and two daughter:-;. Smne 15 years passed by with-
out the plaintiff heing able to collect much money. She 
then filed a l\[otion to have the defendant held in con-
tempt of Court and a .Motion asking judgment against 
hiln for the instalhnents due and unpaid. The Court 
at the hottmn of Page 678, paragraph 2, asks the question 
in this language: 
.. Is a derree directing future payment of alimony 
in itself a "1noney ;judg1nent", either originally 
or with respect to each inHtalhnent as it hecon1es 
due; or is there no enforceable judgment for 
money in the wife's favor until, after the accrual 
of installment:-;, an additional decree has been 
entered awarding judgment thereon, pursuant 
to her motion therefor accompanied by a show-
ing of the amount which has become due and 
which has not been paid~" 
and answers that question in the following languages at 
the bottmn of the left hand column of Page 681, as 
follows: 
"For reasons which will app'ear later, we hold 
that an award of alimony is a judgment for 
1noney, on which rxerntion may issue. It is per-
haps convenient, and certainly not in1proper, for 
the Court to enter a new judgment establishing 
of record the accrued installm'ents which are un-
paid, when the wife draws the facts to the court's 
attention. But that ]Jroccd 11 re is not essential. 
13 
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Installments which have become due are easily 
calculated from the terms of the original decree 
and a look at the calendar. The wife's application 
for a writ of execution accmnpanied hy her af-
fidavit as to non-payment should nwve the issu-
ance of the writ; if an issue is raised concerning 
the an1ount due, the court can determine it." 
(Italics ours) 
The Court com1nents upon the rights under alimony 
payments payable in future installments as follows at 
the bottmn of the left hand colu1nn on page 684: 
"We conclude, therefore, that the District 
Court here cannot modify or re1nit installments 
of alimony after they have becmne due hy the 
terms of the original judgn1ent which ordered 
their payment. When a decree award::; alilnony 
payable in future installn1ents, the right to each 
instalhnent becmnes absolute and vested when 
it becmne:-; due, provided no nwdification of the 
decree had been n1ade prior to it~ Inaturity. Each 
installment which 1natures under a decree which 
has not been n1odified becomes a judg1nent delJt 
Rimi]ar to any other judgment for 1110ney. rrhe 
original decree i:-; final in eharacter with respect 
to each 1natured instalhnent and so eannot be 
ehallenged here and should not be challenged 
elsewhere. Execution nmy i~:-;ue upon it. It is 
therefore unnecessary to seek in the original 
action a .. nwney judg1nent". although, upon a 
showing· made to the eourt of the mnount of the 
matured instalhnent~ whieh ren1ain unpaid, it is 
not improper for the District Court to note of 
record the mnount which i~ then due under the 
original judgment.'' 
SNOW v:-;. SNOW. 177 Southern, 793. In this case 
the wife obtained a divorce and was allowed alilnony 
in the sum of $+0.00 per month for herself and $20.00 
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per month for her two (•hildren. Delinquency accrued 
and Hhe fi1<·<l a petition to have the amount of the past 
dun alimony determined and fixed, in order that she 
might lutYP the jndgnwnt executed. 
'rhP dPfendant, father, set up several defenses to 
this petition, including her refusal to let him see the 
child, the lack of adequate earnings to pay the judgment 
and asked that he he relieved of past due alimony. His 
counsel referred to CO~IPTON vs. AIRIAL, 9 La. Ann., 
496. 'rhe Court rejected the defendant's contention that 
the ( iompton vs. Airial, supra, was authority for the 
defendant':-~ contention and conunented on that case as 
follows at the hottmn of the right hand column of page 
197: 
"Compton VH. Airial is not authority for the pro-
position, and in fact there is no authority for 
the proposition, that a woman to whmn alimony 
is due under a judgment against her husband 
1nust first bring a proceeding such as this, and 
have the mnount of the past due alimony deter-
lnined hy anoth'er judicial decree, before she can 
have execution issued on the original decree con-
demning the husband to pay the alimony." 
The Court further states at the middle of th'e left 
hand column of page 800 in this case as follows: 
"First, that, generally speaking, where a 
decree is rendered for alimony and is made pay-
able in future instalments, the right to such in-
stalments becomes absolute and vested upon be-
cmning due, and is therefore protected by the full 
faith and credit clause, pTovided no n1odification 
of the decree has been made prior to the maturity 
of the instahnents, since, as declared in the 
Barber Case, 'alin1ony decreed to a wife in a 
divorce or separation from bed and board is as 
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much a debt of record until the decree has heen 
' . ' " recalled, as any other judgn1ent for money 1~. 
The appellate Court concluded that the District 
Court was right in maintaining that they had no author-
ity to release the defendant frmn his deht for past due 
installments of alimony as aRked by the defendant. 
STEELE v. STEELE, 239 P 2, 63. A California 
case, 1952. In this case the Decree called for $75.00 per 
1nonth which was reduced to $65.00 per 1nonth. The 
plaintiff filed an affidavit in which she averred that 
$909.93 wa~ past due and in arrears and without notice 
to the defendant a writ of execution issued. The Court 
on the defendant's 1notion recalled the writ, reduced the 
paym'ents to $50.00 per 1nonth and ordered the defendant 
to pay $10.00 per month on the delinquency. The plain-
tiff appealed and the Order which permitted the defend-
ant to pay the delinquency at the rate of $10.00 per 
month was r'eversecl, the court holding that the plaintiff 
had an absolute right to have the writ of execution issued 
and levied, the court statinp; at page 64: 
,.rrhe plaintiff to a diYorre action is entitled to an 
execution as to unpai<l installments of a snpport 
award that haY<' accrued within five years of the 
date of the application on an ex parte application 
though it he made 1nore than five years after 
tlw entry of tlw d0rree or ordt•r making tlw 
award." 
The following ra~<'s have affirnwd the Steele v. 
Steele (;asP: 
WOLF.,J1J v~. \YOLFJ,~. 180 Parific :.?, :~-1-:>. 
1\Il LLA HD vs. l\riLLAHD, :.?:.?1 Pacific :.?, 4-71 
DI < 1( )RPO vs. DI COR PO, 200 Pacific :.?, 3:.?!). 
The ( 1ourt's attention is directed to a rather lengthy 
discussion of the proble1ns existing in the present case 
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under the annotation ALIMONY OR SUPPORT DE-
C'RER -- Lll~1N, i11 50 ALR 2, 651. In tlw case cited 
under d i~<·H~sion .Jonp:-; v .. Jono~, a lirn was impressed 
on the fat hrr's intere~t in eertain real estate by lang-
nag<' in the dl'<'I'P<> itself, so that rasP is not a point here, 
hnt beginning- nnder NPdion 10, pagP 674, the Court 
· there di sells~<·d "~fatu n•d or past-due instalhnents as 
Iirn," and : .. :fated: 
"[n :t nmul,<•r of cases it has been express}~' hel<l 
that under statutes subjecting decrees for ali1nony 
or support to the rules applicable to ordinary 
judglll<'ll ts a dreree for periodical payments for 
support n1oney or ali1nony constitutes a lien as to 
matured or past due and unpaid installments." 
The demurrer in the Beesley case supra to the plain-
tiff's complaint was sustained for as the Court points 
out at Page 4;jg: 
"There are no allegations in the cmnplaint of 
and default in th'e payment of any installments 
of the decreed alimony or that there was due any 
due or unpaid when the .complaint was filed; nor 
is there otherwise any breach of the divorce de-
cree alleged * ·" * " 
It was Mrs. Beesley's inability to allege a delinquency 
which resulted in th'e defendant's Demurrer being sus-
tained. 
A divorce decree awarding support money differs 
fron1 a lump sum 1noney judgment only in that it is 
payable in monthly installments. In both judgments an 
award of n1oney is 1nacle to the plaintiff, which if not 
paid, is a lien against any real property of the de-
fendant. To ascertain what a1nount is due requires a 
look at the calendar to see what installments have ac-
crued under the divorce decree and to see what interest 
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has accrued. This is also true under an ordinary n1oney 
judgment. Then inquiry is made of the judgment credi-
tor to see if it has been paid in full or in part and a 
lien exists for the sums accrued and unpaid. 
POINT 3. 
NOTICE TO TI-IE CLAIMANT BUYER WAS 
ADEQUA'"PE TO PUT TI-IEM: ON A DUTY OF IX-
QUIRY. 
The purpose of entering and docketing a judg-
ment so far as the examiner of abstracts is con-
cerned is to advise the exan1iner of the 'existance of the 
judgment and to put the buyer on notice of that judg-
ment. r:rhe buyer or his counsel is then required to as-
c'ertain whether or not the judgment is outlawed by the 
statute of lirnitations, whether or not it is paid but not 
satisfied of record, or partially paid and what sums are 
presently due thereunder. This is true whether it is a 
prmnissory note jndgnwnt or a decree providing for 
future installments of support money. Except by satis-
faction of the judgnwnt which rernoves the question en-
tirely or h~· the statute of lirnitations running agaim;;t 
some judgm'ent, the mnount due thereunder, whether 
an ordinary rnoney judgrnent or an instalhnent support 
rnoney judgmnt, is not known to the abstract exarniner 
and the records do not r0v0al the facts necessary to as-
certain the preci~e amount then due under the judgment. 
'rhe respondents, Baggs, were advised by their legal 
f•ounsel that there was a judgment lien for alirnony and 
support rnoney against George .A. Boyl'e, Jr., which con-
stituted a cloud on the title to said real property. (See 
paragraph 11 of Plaintiff and Appellant's petition, which 
allegations are deemed admitted for the purpose of this. 
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~lotion to Di:·nniss.) 
In 'eitlwr ease the Clrrk of the Court has to rely 
upon the ealenlations or state1nents by the plaintiff when 
he files hi~ prr<·ipe in whieh he states the mnount due 
under the ju<lgmrnt as ealeulated hy hint, a~ a basis for 
the issnanre of a writ of ex'ecution. 
\Vhat <loP~ any prospective purchaser of real prop-
Prt~· do when he is advised that tlw seller has a recorded 
judgment against hi1n? He proeePds to find out what 
has been paid ~ineP the judg1nent was entered. Where 
does he go to find the answer to these questions~ Is the 
judgment outlawed by the statute of lin1itations? Is 
the judgment pai(l hut not satisfied of record? Has the 
;judg1nent been a~~igned~ What portion of the principle 
is still due? What is the amount of the accrued interest~ 
Is the judg1nent creditor ·still alive? What sums does 
the judg1nent creditor claim are still du'e under the 
judgment? 
If the judgment is not outlawed by the statute of 
limitations or released then the prospective purchaser 
must 1nake inquiry beyond th'e record to learn the statu3 
of that judg1nent. He n1ust contact the plaintiff's at-
torney of record or try to find the judgment creditor and 
otherwise infonn himself of the sums due claimed under 
the judgment. In an ordinary money judgm'ent a lump 
smn is fixed and the mnount due thereunder varie8 as 
payments are rnade and interest accrues. Under support 
1noney judgn1ents the 1nonthly amount is certain and as 
the months pass the record reveals that a sum certain 
has accrued. The inquiry in both judgments is the same. 
Has the n1oney been paid·? 
:\n exmnination of the Court file in the case of 
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Boyle v. Boyle revealed that an Order directing pay-
ment of $5.00 per month on delinquent support payments 
was entered, although the a1nount of the delinquency is 
missing from the Court's order. (See paragraph No.4 of 
plaintiff and appellant's petition). The alimony payment 
ledger kept hy the County Clerk would reveal the pay-
Inents 1nade hy the defendant George A. Boyle, Jr., (See 
plaintiff and appellant's answer to interrogatories on 
deposition before a cmnmission) in which she answers 
that all payments 1nade hy the defendant George A. 
Boyle, .Jr., were n1ade through the Clerk of the Court. 
A call to the plaintiff and appellant's counsel would have 
revealed sun1s due under th'e judgment. 
The respondents, Baggs, apparently disregarded 
the advice of counsel and without any inquiry into the 
matter elected to purchase th'e property frmn the de-
fendant, George A. Boyle, .Jr. The respondents, Baggs, 
are not hona fide purchasers for value, having disre-
garded counsel's advice regarding the title, and having 
1nade no inquiry concerning the payments made under 
the support n1oney judgment. 
The right of 1ninor children to collect fron1 their 
divorced father the support awarded to th'mn by the 
Court would see1n to be a decree carrying with it such 
social and welfare considerations, that it would be en-
titled to every reasonable interpretation that would aid 
in attaining the purposes for which it wa~ entered, that 
is, the full pa~nnent of the sums therein required to be 
paid. 
Respondents and Clainw.nts having been advised 
by their counsel that this judgn1ent constituted a lien 
and cloud on the title should now be precluded frmn re-
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ga1n1ng the funds which they paid on the purchase 
contract inas1nuch as they disregarded the risk they 
were advised existed at the time of purchase. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the appellant respectfully submits 
that the authorities sustain her position that a judgment 
calling for installment payments of support money be-
came a lien on the property of the said George A. Boyle, 
.Jr., after the same accrued and were unpaid without any 
new or subsequent proceeding to fix the amount due 
thereunder and that her petition should be granted and 
funds held by the Clerk of the Court sufficient to cover 
her judgment and accrued interest be ordered released 
to her. 
Respectfully subrnitted, 
GLENN W. ADAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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